MDeleo,

Back to your question about forklifts, there is (or used to be) a company based in Alpharetta, Georgia, USA called Requip Systems that had a system of tracking forklift usage (and misusage or abuse) with data such as run time, idle time, bumps, tips, and various data related to the function of the lifts. Data was transmitted through a wireless network.

I tried to find them with a Google Search but found only dead ends.

If you can locate them their product may be of some interest.

Good Luck,

I agree with Sam Pickens. Oil analysis and coolant can be cost drivers if you follow the manufacturer recommendations specially when you have a fleet of forklifts. For battery operated forklift, this is not an issue. When you do an RCM, some of the manufacturer's recommended task may not be worth doing in your case or the frequency modified.

Thanks everybody for yours comments. I have learned more RCM reading this that in some books. Regarding the Canpeng´s post (oct,24), we actually do preventive maintenance to the forklifts, however, I believe that we have some tasks that are not of great value for the reliability of the equipment, and consume only manhours and spareparts. Thanks a lot for your post.
Harvey, I believe that this information can help me. I am going to look for it.

Returning to an earlier post by Daryl and Vee:

Actually, 'bird strikes' and other issues can be handled through the RCM process. In particular, if these 'instantaneous' failures can be identified either through the initial process, or as part of a maintenance effectiveness review, then something can be done.

Case in point: Recently I did a motor management survey at a site. A literal lightning strike had damaged many of their variable frequency drives, motors and other related electrical/electronic systems. The resolution was two-fold: a) Cleanliness of equipment in order to improve resistance to failure; b) Installation of distribution system lightning arrestors, in plant, and local lightning arrestors for remote equipment. As these issues had been repetitive (approximately every two years), the simple payback was determined to be a matter of a few months.

As for wastewater treatment: Solid objects coming through and damaging pumping systems? Redesign the system. Grinder pumps can do amazing things, these days. Also, strainers, etc.

While you cannot avoid them all, or should not expect to, Condition-Based Maintenance, of which RCM is the hub, does not just call for a method of detecting wear. It also provides a method for recognizing unique issues that can be resolved through a number of strategies, including redesign. Even through issues of human error, etc.

Sincerely,
Howard

Howard,

This was part of the argument I was making.

However we didnt need, nor could we afford, to go to the redesign of the physical asset on this one. But we did correct the issue.

Regards

Daryl,

Clearly we are not on the same page. You are also assigning motives to me without trying to understand my stated views, e.g. I do not make ˜disparaging' remarks about ˜bird-strike' type events, this is only to identify one type of failure pattern. More of this later. As before I will comment on your statements after cutting and pasting them, as you claim I am quoting you out of context.

Daryl: Yes I am implying exactly that. Mainly due to the fact, as I have stated elsewhere, that the dat ais generally not available for what we need to analyse. There is a need to be pragmatic and to apply the method with what we have. I disagree with the five points, which you have simultaneously stated that you should have before the analysis and that you shouldnt have before the analysis.

Comment: First , I am referring to ALL data, not merely reliability data. Let us tackle the ˜other' data first, where I think there will be no disagreement. These include, e.g. P&I Ds, process data (flows, pressures temperatures etc.), capacities, duty curves, metallurgical data, operating context information etc. I hope you agree that we need this set at least.

Next the reliability data. As you know well, there are many sources of reliability data, from published sources to own analysis. In my view, one of the most important sources of data is that provided by the experience of operators and maintainers at site. Talking to them can be invaluable.

Lastly, I cant recall saying you need ALL the data BEFORE starting an RCM analysis. If I have given that impression, please accept my apologies.

Daryl: Surely you of all people are familiar with Resnikovs conundrum. Are you implying that waiting until we have the failure data, therefore the failures which could have severe consequences, prior to trying to develop management regimes for asset systems?

As to Resnikoff, I am well aware of his thesis, and accept it fully. However, as an RCA practitioner, you will be aware that serious incidents do not just happen, there is always a cause chain. Before e.g., a Gas Compressor trips, one or more of many other smaller failures would have occurred, e.g., surge control out of tune, axial displacement probe out of calibration, lub oil quality degraded, gear box out of alignment, motor cooling-air filter choked, liquid carry-over into inlet etc. Resnikoff applies at the ˜Compressor tripped' level, not at the ˜axial probe out of calibration' level. At this level, Resnikoff is not relevant, as data on such failures MUST be available, either in-house or from e.g. IEEE.

Quoting Resnikoff is therefore (at least in my view) simply a red herring. There is no excuse not to collect data at the failure mode level, which is where we need it in an RCM study. The more important argument is this: the contribution of the FMEA part in an RCM is (in my experience) just about 60% of the value added by an RCM analysis, the rest coming from knowing the reliability data. The last point is that ball-park reliability figures are better than so-called ˜engineering judgment' data, which, in my experience are often figures plucked out of the air.
I remind you that the R in RCM matters, that is a significant result of the Nowlan & Heap study.

Daryl: This is simply not true Vee, the vast majority of failures are due to either poor operations and other human error induced factors. A large number of additional failures are due to operations exceeding, oftentime deliberately, the inherent capacity of the physical asset. Either knowingly due to a range of factors, or unknowingly due to the effects of inter-related systems etc. (One of the common after effects of Root cause analysis in my experience)

Comment: I don't dispute for one minute that human errors, or operating equipment outside the design envelope are significant causes of failures. All I am asking you is whether in any of your RCM studies, you can point to a human error recorded as a failure mode. Give me an example please.

Daryl: SAE JA1012 (JA1011) In fact it points towards the inclusion of human errors within RCM analyses

Comment: We will pick this point up once you give us some examples of human error as failure modes. SAE JA 1011/12 is absolutely on the ball; but including human errors does not make them failure modes. Failure rates apply to failures, not their causes. If human error is found to be a cause of failure, and if the consequences were large enough, we would have a clear solution from the decision chart – redesign the equipment, people (by training) or procedures (by reviews).

Daryl: Vee, there is no degradation mechanism associated with what comes down the tubes, it is pretty much determined by what is put in the other end. And that means the public. However, while there is no degradation trigger, there is very definitely a randomness about it, and yes .. RCM can and does assist them in managing these issues and other similar issues.

Comment: I had assumed, perhaps incorrectly, that the waste water treatment plants had trash-racks, log-stoppers or drum-screens at their plant inlets. These will show a differential pressure, thus revealing their degradation or fouling rate. Do they need an RCM study to tell them how to follow basic engineering design principles? If so, I feel sorry for their plight.

Daryl: Regardless of you continuing to speak disparagingly regarding your "bird strike" variety failures,

Daryl: SO in one hit you are trying to take the discussion back to "its all about asset failures due to degradation". Which is simply no thte case.

Comment: I am NOT speaking disparagingly. You call the N-H 89% as random. I have explained that randomness in timing of failures is NOT the same as randomness of cause, and I think you now agree. Of this N-H 89%, a small part is due to truly random causes, such as bird-strikes, floating debris in cooling water, nails on the road etc. The vast majority though have identifiable causes. Thus, ball bearings fail due to race-fatigue, people die of heart attacks or cancer due to genetic predisposition or life-styles, light bulbs due to thermal/mechanical fatigue etc. These causes often show a degradation pattern, e.g., bearings show higher vibration levels, people with increasing cholesterol levels seem more prone to heart attacks etc. Understanding the process can help us in one of two ways,
1. Predict the time of failure, as in bearings, or
2. Take steps to reduce the rate of degradation, as in the heart attack case

Hence I have to disagree with your observation; like it or not, degradation mechanisms are at the heart of most failures.

Daryl, please try and support every statement you make with an example or two (as in the waste water case), so we can follow your thought process. It makes it easier for us as readers to understand your position. I request you to keep the discussion at a factual plane, without making judgments about others. I am uncomfortable with your assuming e.g., that I am disparaging, when I most emphatically, am not. Whether you intend it to be so or not, I find some of your statements a bit condescending. I respect your knowledge and experience, and would enjoy these exchanges a lot more if you checked for these nuances before hitting the ˜send' button.

Regards.

V.Narayan.

MDeloe,

Without comment on the periferal discussion-

If you are really interested and aren't able to find them, I might be able to contact a former CSI rep who left CSI to join Requip.

It has been a few years since I spoke with him, but I may be able to contact him at his most recent residence.

I think Requip was a new venture in the late 1990's and may have either been bought by another company or gone out of business.

Let me know if you need me to pursue this any further.

Vee,

I am becoming annoyed by the continual attempt to belittle the information that I keep on giving you here.

For your information every challenge that you have placed on the discussion, once youy are backed into a corner and the logic starts to run out, I have answered.

I don't intend to keep on doing so as it just leads to further questioning and accusations. In particular I am not impressed with the swipe about keeping things factual. Every post I have placed here is fact based and is driven by the findings of the team of RCM Analysts under my control as well as the International RCM Analyst worldwide.

I will answer your points here in no particular order.

1. Yet again you have taken me out of context. I am not sure if this is deliberate through malice, accidental through not reading the post, or for some other reason.

I made the comments about Resnikov prior to you clarifying your statements about data. (Namely that you have now accepted, or at least clarified, that you were talking about both data and knowledge, the two sides of the information equation)

So to tackle these after having made this clarification is somewhat dishonest. Either that or I did not make myself clear, so I will clarify here also.

Resnikov in the book Mathematical aspects of RCM went into detail regarding the fact that generation of failure data requires failures and therefore this is, in itself, a failure of maintenance. (Paraphrasing here)

The implications of this are of course massive. One of which is that it is actually an unethical practice for modern asset managers, given the current environment and other issues, to use the excuse of waiting to generate the failure data prior to taking action.

So what else could I have been talking about Vee? Of course this was focussed on your previous points, now clarified, regarding needing data. So to call this a red herring, in the context in which it was used, is simply false.

I am sorry that your experience with engineering judgement ahs been that they are "figures plucked out of the air" this is not my experience and I teach our analysts how to avoid this sort of thing. I don't differentiate between what you are terming experience and engineering judgement as one leads to the ability to do the other.

I would again refer you to Resnikovs conundrum: At times it is simply the case that engineering judgement is the only information available.

2. I have already spoken to the point regarding data, but to clarify yes of course information like what you have mentioned is a starting point. But so too is the expert judgement of those who use the assets and others withint he industry, or external to it, who may have a deeper understanding of those assets.

3. I have stated here that 89% of failures in the NH report were not age related. I have never stated that they were all random, in fact only 14% were random failures. This is another misunderstanding or misrepresentation. (Deliberate or otherwise)

Regarding your point about randomness of failures not being the same as randomness of cause. I have illustrated cases where this is the case previously, and I have illustrated cases where this is not the case.

For example, elements of race fatigue are not necesarily a direct age relation due to the complexity of wear pressures and their unpredictable nature. (And prior to going down this path, I am not saying you can't predict these failures)

In general these are two different items but the discussion didnt start ehre at all nor am I going to entertain it at this point.

4. Your comments regarding waste water treatment plants are uninformed and miss some of the points here. There are substantial human errors involved in this sort of thing, along with changes due to climate changes, changes due to increases in demand beyond expectations, and other items that come through the system in an unpredictable form.

The standard inlet screens that are used on pretty much all waste water plants throughout the world are simply not up to the new levels of challenges that they are being placed under. (And contributing to this is issues such as reductions in Head room etc)

There are a range of factors here which go well beyond asset management theory and into the minutue of financially regulated industries. Again, not something that I am going to go into here as it will probably send people to sleep.

Nice of you to question their abilities, but it is a bit deeper than what you are alluding to Vee.

5. I have given a range of example of human error which you were dismissive of. I will give you some others:

• Operation outside of "normal" parameters
  
• Poor reassembley and/or installation
  
• Poor reaction to abnormal circumstances
  
• Procedures containing error inducing elements
  
• Items left in an incorrect state after maintenance or after a shutdown for example
  

Vee, I do support everything that I write here and am happy to do so. However there are two issues here above all else that you seem to be finding hard to come to grips with.

One - Maintenance is not just about "greasing the motor" or "taking the reading". It is about everything that needs to be done to support the continuing operation of the assets in their current operating context.

This includes operations, asset design, human interaction, performance of software systems, integration of data, ergonomics issues and so on and so forth.

The continual assertion that it is all about degradation and all about the particular assets failing, of which a large part of it is, is just not true and will lead to limited effectiveness of RCM analysis or of RCA applciations or any other form of reliability application.

Like it or not Vee assets are becoming more and more complex, automation is becoming more and more prevalent, and the impact of humans on the process is becoming more and more important. Ignore this at your clients peril.

(As a side note I would point you towards James Reasons volumes of work on this subject, as well as the Rasmussen work on the three mile island incident.)

Vee, a shocking thought just occurred to me. Are you stating here that you have never come accross a human error in any of your RCM work?

6. You speak very disparagingly about the concept of random failures through items such as lightning strikes, and other random events. You are dismissive of this regardless of the fact that it is a very important area and one where the clinging onto "everything is about degradation" falls apart suddenly.

Vee, I and others who read through this, would probably appreciate it if you could stick to the issues, not change the conterxt of what is being said and don't become insulting just because your opinions are being challenged.

This is a public space and if you cannot handle your opinions being challenged then maybe you shouldn't make them in public.

In your assertion regarding factualness or lack of in any of my postings is insulting, unfounded and not conducive to the discussion at hand. I may have gotten a little heated at times, in this posting in particular, but I have never accused you of inventing anything.

Maybe you should check through the logic of what you are sending prior to hitting the send button to ensure that there is maybe not another way at looking at things.

There is no intention to be condescending, but I am surprised regarding some of the stances that you take and I think this is what you are seeing. The written word is difficult because you can't see my face nor I yours.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: <Ozgipsy>,

OK, guys.

Please take this to another string or outside the forum.

Howard

When you are up to your ass amongst aligators, it is difficult to remember that the first objective was to drain the swamp